Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104129
Authors: 
Reisinger, Markus
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2004-27
Abstract: 
This paper analyses a two-sided market in which two platforms compete against each other. One side, the advertisers, exerts a negative externality on the ther side, the users. It is shown that if platforms can charge advertisers only, a higher degree of competition for users can lead to higher profits because competition on the advertisers' side is reduced. If platforms can charge users as well, profits might increase or decrease, the latter because of increased competition through the additional instrument of the user fee. Nevertheless the equilibrium with user fee is more efficient.
Subjects: 
Negative Externalities
Price Competition
Two-Sided Markets
JEL: 
D43
D62
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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