Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103917 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 513
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
Amartya Sen (1970) has shown that three natural desiderata for social choice rules are inconsistent: universal domain, respect for unanimity, and respect for some minimal rights - which can be interpreted as either expert rights or liberal rights. Dietrich and List (2008) have generalised this result to the setting of binary judgement aggregation. This paper proves that the liberal paradox holds even in the framework of probabilistic opinion pooling and discusses options to circumvent this impossibility result: restricting the aggregator domain to profiles with no potential for conflicting rights, or considering agendas whose issues are not all mutually interdependent.
Schlagwörter: 
probabilistic opinion pooling
Sen's liberal paradox
expert rights
liberal rights
unanimity
general aggregation theory
JEL: 
D71
D82
C11
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
351.24 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.