Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103665
Authors: 
Hansen, Ann-Kristin
Joseph, Kissan
Krafft, Manfred
Year of Publication: 
2008
Citation: 
[Journal:] BuR - Business Research [ISSN:] 1866-8658 [Volume:] 1 [Year:] 2008 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 94-104
Abstract: 
The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization.
Subjects: 
pricing authority
delegation
determinants of price delegation
pricing
sales force management
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article

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