Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102951
Authors: 
Casal, Sandro
Ploner, Matteo
Sproten, Alec N.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IWQW Discussion Paper Series 13/2014
Abstract: 
Asset management often involves a conflict of interests between investors and fund managers. A main goal of financial regulators is to identify and mitigate this conflict. This article focuses on measures that may foster protection of investors' interests. In an experiment capturing the essential elements of asset management, we find that managers' accountability does not prevent their opportunistic behavior if not backed by a threat of punishment. Further, investors inefficiently sanction managers if not completely aware of managers' choices. To effectively protect investors in financial intermediations, financial regulators should ensure both managers' accountability and a credible sanctioning system.
Subjects: 
Delegated risky decisions
Monetary conflict of interest
Asset management
Experiment
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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