Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/102951 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IWQW Discussion Papers No. 13/2014
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW), Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Asset management often involves a conflict of interests between investors and fund managers. A main goal of financial regulators is to identify and mitigate this conflict. This article focuses on measures that may foster protection of investors' interests. In an experiment capturing the essential elements of asset management, we find that managers' accountability does not prevent their opportunistic behavior if not backed by a threat of punishment. Further, investors inefficiently sanction managers if not completely aware of managers' choices. To effectively protect investors in financial intermediations, financial regulators should ensure both managers' accountability and a credible sanctioning system.
Schlagwörter: 
Delegated risky decisions
Monetary conflict of interest
Asset management
Experiment
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
392.31 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.