Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102663
Authors: 
Gorelkina, Olga
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014/10
Abstract: 
This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the knowledge of colluders┬┤ identities or distributions of valuations, in which sense it is entirely detail-free.
Subjects: 
Bidder collusion
detail-free auctions
Vickrey auction
JEL: 
D82
C72
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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