Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101754
Authors: 
Bommer, Rolf
Year of Publication: 
1995
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge: Serie II, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 "Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft", Universität Konstanz 262
Abstract: 
The Pollution-Haven Hypothesis suggests that tight environmental standards reduce domestic producers' competitiveness and give rise to their relocating to countries with more lenient standards. This paper questions that relocation is always caused by reduced competitiveness at home. By using a signaling approach, I show that relocation can be undertaken for purely strategic reasons. Relocation is the producer's tool to convince the policy maker to refrain from a further tightening of environmental control. I show that trade liberalization increases probability of strategic relocation.
Subjects: 
environmental policy
trade liberalization
industrial competitiveness
international political economy
signaling
JEL: 
D78
F13
F15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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