Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101610
Authors: 
Körber, Achim
Kolmar, Martin
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge: Serie II, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 "Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft", Universität Konstanz 301
Abstract: 
This paper considers the players' behaviour in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to "struggle" and when to "subjugate"? Analysing contest-success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for "struggle" or "war" have to be met. Thus, such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive. If a self-interested rule-setter chooses the contest-success function endogenously we show that one player will always subjugate. Applications to rent-seeking and environmental regulation are discussed.
Subjects: 
Lobbying
Contest
JEL: 
D72
D78
L12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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