Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101599
Authors: 
Glazer, Amihai
Konrad, Kai A.
Year of Publication: 
1992
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge: Serie II, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 "Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft", Universität Konstanz 190
Abstract: 
A rich person who fears a loss of income may later favor redistributive taxation and a mix of taxes and public goods that differs from the one he now favors. If mobility is costly, and if government in each period uses majority voting to determine policy, then this person may prefer to live in a community that is permanently ruled by poor residents. Majority voting is a mechanism that can overcome intertemporal commitment problems of income insurance.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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