Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101365
Authors: 
Khan, M. Ali
Rath, Kali P.
Sun, Yeneng
Yu, Haomiao
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics 585
Abstract: 
We present a comprehensive theory of large non-anonymous games in which agents have a name and a determinate social-type and/or biological trait to resolve the dissonance of a (matching-pennies type) game with an exact pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with finite agents, but without one when modeled on the Lebesgue unit interval. We (i) establish saturated player spaces as both necessary and sufficient for an existence result for Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, (ii) clarify the relationship between pure, mixed and behavioral strategies via the exact law of large numbers in a framework of Fubini extension, (iii) illustrate corresponding asymptotic results.
Subjects: 
Large non-anonymous games
social-type
traits
pure strategy
mixed strategy
behavioral strategy
saturated probability space
exact law of large numbers
ex-post Nash equilibrium
asymptotic implementation
JEL: 
C62
D50
D82
G13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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