Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101125
Authors: 
Leppälä, Samuli
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/2
Abstract: 
Arrow's information paradox asserts that demand for undisclosed information is undefined. Reassessing the paradox, I argue that the value of information for the buyer depends on its relevance, which can be known ex ante, and the uncertainty shifts to the capability of the seller to acquire the knowledge and her reliability in disclosing it. These three together form the buyer's reservation price. Consequently, differences in capability and reliability between the sellers may revoke the appropriation problem of nonproprietary information, where the original source loses her monopoly after the first purchase.
Subjects: 
Arrow's information paradox
markets for information
knowledge
reliability
appropriability
JEL: 
D83
L15
O31
O34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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