Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100577
Authors: 
Lohse, Tim
Konrad, Kai A.
Qari, Salmai
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Taxation III C15-V3
Abstract: 
We study deception choices and deception detection in a tax compliance experiment. We find large systematic differences in individual deception abilities. Tax payers are conscious about their own deception abilities. The empirical outcomes are in line with a theory suggesting that tax payers make their choices whether to underreport or report truthfully on the basis of their own deception ability. Tax payers with high deception ability are more likely to underreport. This selection effect is stronger if the fines for underreporting are higher. These results provide an (additional) reason why random audits are superior to audits based on discretionary choice.
JEL: 
H31
K42
C91
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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