Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100529
Authors: 
Kuzmics, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Invited Session - Theoretischer Ausschuss E01-V2
Abstract: 
Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of "always pass on the left" and "always pass on the right" are always equilibria of this game. Some such games, however, also have other (pure strategy) equilibria with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination. Perhaps sur- prisingly, in some such games, these Pareto-inefficient equilibria, with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination, are the only evolutionarily stable equilibria of the game.
JEL: 
C72
C73
D82
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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