Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100452
Authors: 
Matter, Ulrich
Stutzer, Alois
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Collective Decision Making II B06-V4
Abstract: 
Attorneys elected to the US House of Representatives and to US state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation, but more likely to support bills that extend tort law. This finding is based on the analysis of 54 votes at the federal and state level between 1995 and 2012. It holds when controlling for legislators ideology and is particularly strong for term-limited lawyer-legislators. The empirical regularity is consistent with the hypothesis that lawyer- legislators, at least in part, pursue their private interests when voting on tort issues. Our results highlight the relevance of legislators identities and individual professional interests for economic policy making.
JEL: 
D72
K13
C81
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.