Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100366
Authors: 
Meier, Volker
Rainer, Helmut
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Child Care C02-V1
Abstract: 
We consider a bargaining model in which husband and wife decide on the allocation of time and disposable income. Since her bargaining power would go down otherwise more strongly, the wife agrees to having a child only if the husband also leaves the labor market for a while. The daddy months subsidy enables the couple to overcome a hold-up problem and thereby improves efficiency. However, the same ruling harms cooperative couples and may also reduce welfare in an endogenous taxation framework.
JEL: 
J13
J22
H21
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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