Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/98938 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 8231
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper considers the relationship between work status and decision-making power of the head of household and his spouse. I use household fixed effects models to address the possibility that spousal work status may be correlated with unobserved factors that also affect bargaining power within the home. Consistent with the hypothesis that greater economic resources yield greater bargaining power, I find that the spouse of the head of household is more likely to be involved in decisions when she has been employed. Similarly, the head of household is less likely to be the sole decision-maker when his spouse works.
Subjects: 
intra-household
bargaining power
decision-making
gender
family
JEL: 
J12
J16
D13
O15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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