Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94370 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 45
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self-insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk-sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversi fiable liquidity risk, i.e. the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversi fiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that empirically banks that are more exposed to undiversifi able liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.
Schlagwörter: 
Bank Capital
Interbank Markets
Liquidity Coinsurance
JEL: 
G21
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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