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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 112
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, a promotion tournament is considered, where, at the beginning of the tournament, it is unknown how long the tournament lasts. Further, the promotion decision is based on the assessments of a supervisor with imperfect recall. In line with psychological research, the supervisor is assumed to either value early or recent impressions more strongly. It is shown that effort may increase or decrease, as the probability of promotion in a certain period gets higher. The single effects determining the sign of the effort change oftentimes depend on how the supervisor processes information.
Schlagwörter: 
Promotion Tournament
Promotion Probability
Imperfect Recall
JEL: 
J33
M51
M52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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