Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81261 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 686
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
A government wanting to promote an efficient allocation of resources as measured by the total surplus, should strategically delegate to its competition authority a welfare standard with a bias in favour of consumers. A consumer bias means that some welfare increasing mergers will be blocked. This is optimal, if the relevant alternative to the merger is another change in market structure that will even further increase the total surplus. Furthermore, a consumer bias is shown to enhance welfare even though it blocks some welfare increasing mergers when the relevant alternative is the status quo.
Schlagwörter: 
Merger Control
Competition Policy
Consumer Surplus
JEL: 
L11
L13
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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