Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73966 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 31.2005
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
By means of a two-jurisdictional model, this paper analyses the optimal division of environmental policymaking functions among the different government levels, identifying the most appropriate level of decentralization in each case. The paper focuses on water resources policies, with an application to Spanish regions during the 1996-2001 period. The estimation of an environmental quality-consumption transformation function allows the implementation of a simulation to find the most efficient policies in the context of water resources.
Subjects: 
Fiscal federalism
Environmental policies
Water resources
JEL: 
H77
Q25
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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