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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62660
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Fainmessery, Itay P. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Goldberg, David A. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-17T11:32:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-17T11:32:02Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62660 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We present a model of repeated games in large buyer-seller networks in the presence of reputation networks via which buyers share information about past transactions. The model allows us to characterize cooperation networks - networks in which each seller cooperates (by providing high quality goods) with every buyer that is connected to her. To this end, we provide conditions under which: [1] the incentives of a seller s to cooperate depend only on her beliefs with respect to her local neighborhood - a subnetwork that includes seller s and is of a size that is independent of the size of the entire network; and [2] the incentives of a seller s to cooperate can be calculated as if the network was a random tree with seller s at its root. Our characterization sheds light on the welfare costs of relying only on repeated interactions for sustaining cooperation, and on how to mitigate such costs. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aBrown University, Department of Economics |cProvidence, RI | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper |x2011-2 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | networks | en |
dc.subject.keyword | moral hazard | en |
dc.subject.keyword | graph theory | en |
dc.subject.keyword | repeated games | en |
dc.title | Bilateral and community enforcement in a networked market with simple strategies | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 655166106 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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