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dc.contributor.authorde Clippel, Geoffroyen
dc.contributor.authorPérez-Castrillo, Daviden
dc.contributor.authorWettstein, Daviden
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-02-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-17T11:30:50Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-17T11:30:50Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62612-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBrown University, Department of Economics |cProvidence, RIen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2010-5en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPareto Efficiencyen
dc.subject.keywordEgalitarian Equivalenceen
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Informationen
dc.titleEgalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn638265169en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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