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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57265
  
Title:Competitive trilateral lobbying for and against subsidizing green energy PDF Logo
Authors:Pethig, Rüdiger
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen, Fakultät III: Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht 150-11
Abstract:A small open economy operates a carbon emission trading scheme and subsidizes green energy. Taking cap-and-trade as given, we seek to explain the subsidy as the outcome of a trilateral tug of war between the green energy industry, the black energy industry and consumers. With parametric functions we fully solve the competitive economic equilibrium and the lobbying Nash equilibrium. We show how the resultant subsidy depends on the political influence of all three lobbying groups and we trace its determinants. Whether consumers have green preferences turns out to be crucial for the results.
Subjects:green preferences
fossil fuel
green energy
green energy subsidy
cap-and-trade
overlapping regulation
competitive lobbying,
JEL:Q42
Q43
Q52
Q54
D72
D78
H23
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Siegen

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