Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53272
Authors: 
Dimitrov, Dinko
Sung, Shao Chin
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Series 52.2011
Abstract: 
We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games.
Subjects: 
Core
Hedonic Games
Monotonicity
Stable Sets
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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