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dc.contributor.authorFlinkerbusch, Kaien
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-17-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-17T16:40:14Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-17T16:40:14Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51361-
dc.description.abstractFrom auction theory we know that multi-unit, pay-as-bid auctions in general lead to bid shading and thus to an inefficient allocation. This result is supported by historical data from the German market for balancing power, which show that bidders bid well above their actual costs. In contrast to the pay-as-bid auction, the Vickrey auction has the dominant strategy property and bidders reveal their true opportunity cost. Consequently, the Vickrey auction allocates efficiently. In this article we show how this auction format can facilitate an efficient capacity procurement process in the German reserve market.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWestfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (CAWM) |cMünsteren
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCAWM Discussion Paper |x52en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelN74en
dc.subject.jelL11en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordElectricity marketen
dc.subject.keywordbalancing poweren
dc.subject.keyworduniform-price auctionen
dc.subject.keywordpay-as-bid auctionen
dc.titleA more efficient procurement mechanism for reserver capacity in the German market for balancing power-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn672475049en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cawmdp:52en

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