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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/50621
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Barde, Sylvain | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-03-24 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-10-21T16:53:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-10-21T16:53:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50621 | - |
dc.description.abstract | An information-theoretic thought experiment is developed to provide a methodology for predicting endowment distributions in the absence of information on agent preferences. The allocation problem is first presented as a stylised knapsack problem. Although this knapsack allocation is intractable, the social planner can nevertheless make precise predictions concerning the endowment distribution by using its information-theoretic structure. By construction these predictions do not rest on the rationality of agents. It is also shown, however, that the knapsack problem is equivalent to a congestion game under weak assumptions, which means that the planner can nevertheless evaluate the optimality of the unobserved allocation. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversity of Kent, School of Economics |cCanterbury | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSchool of Economics Discussion Papers |x11,03 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C02 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C62 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D51 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D83 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Information theoretic measure | en |
dc.subject.keyword | knapsack problem | en |
dc.subject.keyword | congestion game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | potential function | en |
dc.title | Ignorance is bliss: Rationality, information and equilibrium | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 654777837 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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