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dc.contributor.authorLechene, Valérieen
dc.contributor.authorPreston, Ianen
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-01-
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-04T09:19:27Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-04T09:19:27Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47495-
dc.description.abstractWe study non cooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against non cooperative alternatives and the non cooperative model against a general alternative.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) |cLondonen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIFS Working Papers |x10,18en
dc.subject.jelD11en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordIntra-household allocationen
dc.subject.keywordSlutsky symmetryen
dc.subject.stwPrivater Haushalten
dc.subject.stwNachfrageen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.titleNon cooperative household demand-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn63539717Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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