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dc.contributor.authorOlsson, Martonen
dc.contributor.authorSkogman Thoursie, Peteren
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-07-
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-27T09:30:00Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-27T09:30:00Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45766-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates whether the partner's social insurance coverage affects spousal labor supply. Using a reform which increased the sickness insurance coverage for non-government workers, the spousal elasticity of sick days with respect to the partner's benefit is estimated to 0.4. Additional analysis indicates that the partner's insurance coverage is partly affecting spousal labor supply through an insurance effect and the overall effect is particularly large among low income families. Joint leisure is not found to have an effect on the overall effect. We conclude that spouses pool their supply of la-bor. Thus if policy evaluations ignore spousal interactions they will underestimate the effect.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) |cUppsalaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2010:3en
dc.subject.jelH31en
dc.subject.jelJ22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSpousal labor supplyen
dc.subject.keywordspill-overen
dc.subject.keywordsocial insurance programsen
dc.subject.stwSozialversicherungen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsschutzen
dc.subject.stwEheen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten
dc.subject.stwSpillover-Effekten
dc.subject.stwGesetzliche Krankenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwSchwedenen
dc.titleInsured by the partner?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn623161702en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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