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dc.contributor.authorStühmeier, Torbenen
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-18T16:13:04Z-
dc.date.available2011-02-18T16:13:04Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44346-
dc.description.abstractTypically, incumbent providers enjoy a demand-side advantage over any entrant. However, market entrants may enjoy a supply-side advantage in costs over the incumbent, since they are more efficient or operate on innovative technologies, such as the voice of internet protocol (VoIP) telephony. Regulation with a supply-side asymmetry has rarely been addressed. Considering both a supply-side and a demand- side asymmetry, the present model analyzes the effects different regulation regimes. Regulation may have adverse effects on subscribers, market shares, and profits. If providers can discriminate between on-net and off-net prices, asymmetric regulation has no local effect on market shares, independent of any demand- and supply-side asymmetry. Otherwise, with reciprocal termination charges, price discrimination leads to qualitatively same effects than nondiscriminatory pricing.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInternational Telecommunications Society (ITS) |cCalgaryen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|a21st European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Telecommunications at New Crossroads: Changing Value Configurations, User Roles, and Regulation", Copenhagen, Denmark, 13th-15th September 2010 |x34en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.jelL96en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTermination chargesen
dc.subject.keywordInterconnectionen
dc.subject.keywordRegulationen
dc.subject.keywordPrice Discriminationen
dc.subject.keywordVoice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)en
dc.titleFixed to VoIP Interconnection: Regulation with Asymmetric Termination Costs-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654502390en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:itse10:34en

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