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Title:On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability PDF Logo
Authors:Dimitrov, Dinko
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 377
Abstract:The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition property guarantees the existence of semistrictly core stable coalition structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide.
Subjects:Coalition formation
Common ranking property
Hedonic games
Semistrict core
Top coalition property
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-8232
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University

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