Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43811
Authors: 
Shellshear, Evan
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 410
Abstract: 
This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.
Subjects: 
Cooperative game
Core
Stable set
Fuzzy coalition
Fuzzy game
Core stability
JEL: 
C71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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