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dc.contributor.authorKolmar, Martinen
dc.contributor.authorWagener, Andreasen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-31-
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-10T11:58:12Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-10T11:58:12Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39850-
dc.description.abstractContests between groups are plagued by intra-group externalities (freeriding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might not be desirable, neither individually nor socially. In contests among two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound strength differences between groups. If both groups rein in their intra-group externalities, they are both worse off, compared to a situation with free-riding, if they are relatively similar. If they are sufficiently heterogenous, the weak group loses at the expense of the relatively strong group.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3157en
dc.subject.jelZ13en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelN40en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordconflicten
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordgroup-size paradoxen
dc.subject.stwGruppenarbeiten
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwArbeitsorganisationen
dc.subject.stwBetrieblicher Konflikten
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleInefficient group organization as optimal adaption to dominant environments-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn634266233en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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