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Title:A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care PDF Logo
Authors:Bolhaar, Jonneke
Lindeboom, Maarten
van der Klaauw, Bas
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:IZA discussion papers 3698
Abstract:We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate that moral hazard is not important. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for advantageous selection, largely driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences. Finally, we show that ignoring dynamics and unobserved fixed effects changes the results dramatically.
Subjects:Supplementary private health insurance
health care utilization
advantageous selection
moral hazard
panel data
JEL:I11
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008101423
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IZA Discussion Papers, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA)

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