Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35244
Authors: 
Arulampalam, Wiji
Dasgupta, Sugato
Dhillon, Amrita
Dutta, Bhaskar
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 3376
Abstract: 
We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974-75 to 1996-97. We find that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing.
Subjects: 
Redistributive politics
alignment
swing
electoral competition
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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