Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30740
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gersbach, Hans | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-03 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T08:26:40Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T08:26:40Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30740 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal taxation, exemption of the agenda setter from taxation, and a ban on subsidies. In the presence of aggregate shocks to benefits or to costs of public-good provision, tax-sensitive majority rules, where the size of the required majority depends on the aggregate tax revenues, yield first-best allocations if a monotonicity condition is met. Finally, we explore the potential of first-best constitutions to induce voluntary participation by compensating agents belonging to the minority. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2939 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D62 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H40 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | democratic constitutions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tax-sensitive majority rules | en |
dc.subject.keyword | constitutional rules | en |
dc.subject.keyword | provision of public goods | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Versorgung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Demokratie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Abstimmungsregel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verfassungsökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Democratic provision of divisible public goods | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 62011830X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.