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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30631
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Belloc, Marianna | en |
dc.contributor.author | Pagano, Ugo | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-01-26 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T08:23:26Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T08:23:26Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30631 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Most pre-crisis explanations of the various corporate governance systems have considered the separation between ownership and control to be an advantage of the Anglo-American economies. They have also attributed the failure of other countries to achieve these efficient arrangements to their different legal and/or electoral systems. In this paper we compare this view with the co-evolution approach based on the hypothesis that politics and corporate governance influence each other, generating complex interactions of financial and labour market institutions. Countries cluster along different complementary politics-business interaction paths and there is no reason to expect, or to device policies for, their convergence to a single model of corporate governance. We argue that this hypothesis provides a more convincing explanation of the past histories of major capitalist economies and can suggest some useful possible scenarios of their future institutional development. Bayesian model comparison suggests that the co-evolution approach turns out at least as influential as the competing theories in explaining shareholder and worker protection determination. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2883 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G32 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G34 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J50 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K22 | en |
dc.subject.jel | P10 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | employment protection | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corporate governance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | ownership concentration | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bayesian model estimation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bayesian model comparison | en |
dc.title | Politics-business interaction paths | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 61713264X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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