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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | McCannon, Bryan C. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-08-07 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-09-02T12:15:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-09-02T12:15:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27734 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The use of a taser by law enforcement can substitute for either a gun (a more-violent technology) or a mildly-violent technology (such as pepper spray or hands-on tactics). Which is used affects both the severity of harm when used and the amount of resistance, which affects how often it must be used. Thus, does the adoption of a less-violent technology lead to more or less violence? This question is addressed in an application to the adoption of tasers by law enforcement officials. A game-theoretic model is developed and environments where resistance to arrest and expected harm both increase and decrease are identified. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKiel | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2009-36 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K42 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Law enforcement | en |
dc.subject.keyword | less-violent technology | en |
dc.subject.keyword | strategic offsetting behavior | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rechtsdurchsetzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gewalt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kriminalitätsökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Do less-violent technologies result in less violence? A theoretical investigation applied to the use of tasers by law enforcement | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 60625823X | en |
dc.rights.license | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:200936 | en |
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