EconStor >
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26889
  
Title:Netting of capacity in interconnector auctions PDF Logo
Authors:Höffler, Felix
Wittmann, Tobias
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006,5
Abstract:Scarce interconnector capacities are a severe obstacle to transregional competition and a unified market for electricity in the European Union. However, physically the interconnectors are rarely used up to capacity. This is due to the fact that the current allocation schemes make only limited use of the fact that currents in opposing directions cancel out. We propose a netting auction mechanism which makes use of this and in which even small transmission capacities can generate large competitive pressure in adjacent markets. Netting increases the usage of capacity and reduces the auctioneer's incentive to withhold capacity from the auction.
Subjects:Divisible good auctions
interconnector
electricity marktes
competition policy
JEL:L94
D44
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
512217033.PDF438.03 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26889

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.