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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarleen
dc.contributor.authorKoethenbuerger, Markoen
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttormen
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-10-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:41Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:41Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25916-
dc.description.abstractTwo-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook result in one-sided markets is that a government may increase a monopolist's output and reduce the deadweight loss by subsidizing output. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher ad-valorem tax rate - rather than a subsidy - could increase output and enhance welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1871en
dc.subject.jelD4en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH22en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleTaxation in two-sided markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn528739409en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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