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dc.contributor.authorChoné, Philippeen
dc.contributor.authorLinnemer, Laurenten
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-05-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:11:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:11:56Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25771-
dc.description.abstractThe analysis of horizontal mergers hinges on a tradeoff between unilateral effects and efficiency gains. The article examines the role of uncertainty (on the efficiency gains) in this tradeoff. Common wisdom is that the antitrust authorities should be very cautious about random gains. Our results show that dismissing efficiency gains on the sole ground that they are uncertain would not be theoretically founded. Indeed, the attitude towards uncertainty depends on the curvature of the social objective function. We exhibit a number of situations where the objective is convex in the efficiency gains, implying that competition authorities should welcome the risk for a given expectation of efficiency gains. Implications for empirical merger analysis are exposed.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1726en
dc.subject.jelK21en
dc.subject.jelL12en
dc.subject.jelL41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwFusionen
dc.subject.stwHorizontale Konzentrationen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsaufsichten
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbstheorieen
dc.titleAssessing horizontal mergers under uncertain efficiency gains-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn516992465en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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