Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21392
Authors: 
Heckman, James Joseph
Heinrich, Carolyn J.
Smith, Jeffrey A.
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 525
Abstract: 
This paper examines the performance of the JTPA performance system, a widely emulated model for inducing efficiency in government organizations. We present a model of how performance incentives may distort bureaucratic decisions. We define cream skimming within the model. Two major empirical findings are (a) that the short run measures used to monitor performance are weakly, and sometimes perversely, related to long run impacts and (b) that the efficiency gains or losses from cream skimming are small. We find evidence that centers respond to performance standards.
Subjects: 
performance standards
reinventing government
evaluation
JTPA
JEL: 
C31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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