Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20721
Authors: 
Sliwka, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion paper series 1423
Abstract: 
We derive a natural definition of responsibility in a formal model where employees care for their career prospects: A superior holds a subordinate responsible for a task, when she announces her beliefs that this subordinate contributes most to this task. We show, that those announced beliefs lead to a self fulfilling prophecy as the reputation of the responsible subordinate then is affected by the outcome of the task and he therefore has strong incentives to contribute to its success. There are equilibria where either a single agent or no agent is responsible for a task but joint responsibility never arises. Several extensions are discussed.
Subjects: 
responsibility
career concern
reputation
delegation
incentives
JEL: 
M12
D23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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