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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19073
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Konrad, Kai A. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Leininger, Wolfgang | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19073 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort andsequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into agroup of players who choose their efforts ?early? and a group of players who choose ?late?.Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. Thispayoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choiceof timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ?late?,whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the mostprominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zeroaggregate cost. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1609 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | sequential all-pay auction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | complete information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | generalized cost | en |
dc.subject.keyword | generalized Stackelberg game | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktionstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Vollkommene Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kosten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Thegeneralized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 509694217 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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