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dc.contributor.authorKotsogiannis, Christosen
dc.contributor.authorSchwager, Roberten
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:42Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19049-
dc.description.abstractConventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a federal rather thanin a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theoretical evidence to thecontrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized - due to the existence of a horizontalinformation externality - by under-provision of policy innovation. This paper presents asimple model that introduces political competition for federal office. Under such competitionpolitical actors use the innovative policies in order to signal ability to the electorate. In theequilibrium analyzed policy innovation may occur more frequently than in a unitary system. Itis thus shown that, once electoral motives are accounted for, the conventional wisdom islikely to be a valid proposition.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1585en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelR59en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen
dc.subject.keywordpolicy innovationen
dc.subject.keywordpolicy experimentationen
dc.subject.stwFöderalismusen
dc.subject.stwPolitiken
dc.subject.stwInnovationen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the incentives to experiment in federations-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn503740160en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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