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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en
dc.contributor.authorKovenock, Danen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:33Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19028-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenousnoise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attemptto win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player expending the greaterresources wins. In equilibrium, contest effort concentrates on at most two adjacent states ofthe game, the "tipping states", which are determined by the contestants' relative strengths,their distances to final victory, and the discount factor. In these states battle outcomes arestochastic due to endogenous randomization. Both relative strength and closeness to victoryincrease the probability of winning the battle at hand. Patience reduces the role of distance indetermining outcomes.Applications range from politics, economics and sports, to biology, where the equilibriumbehavior finds empirical support: many species have developed mechanisms such ashierarchies or other organizational structures by which the allocation of prizes are governedby possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation why. Compared to asingle-stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall resources that are dissipatedamong the group of players.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1564en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordwinner-take-allen
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionen
dc.subject.keywordtippingen
dc.subject.keywordmulti-stage contesten
dc.subject.keyworddynamic gameen
dc.subject.keywordpreemptionen
dc.subject.keywordconflicten
dc.subject.keyworddominanceen
dc.subject.stwAuktionen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwRationales Verhaltenen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbstheorieen
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleEquilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-war-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn50368998Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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