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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Alesina, Alberto | en |
dc.contributor.author | Tabellini, Guido | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:30Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:30Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19020 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal policies, namelyspending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) inrecessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon politicaldistortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Votershave incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand morepublic goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when theeconomy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations basedpurely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1556 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H6 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H3 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Konjunktur | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wahlverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | OECD-Staaten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Entwicklungsländer | en |
dc.title | Why is fiscal policy often procyclical? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 503671800 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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