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dc.contributor.authorAmegashie, J. Atsuen
dc.contributor.authorRunkel, Marcoen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:07Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1500en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionen
dc.subject.keywordelimination contestsen
dc.subject.keywordpotential rivalen
dc.subject.keywordsabotageen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftskriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleSabotaging potential rivals-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500517312en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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