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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18931
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Boerner, Kira | en |
dc.contributor.author | Hainz, Christa | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:53Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:53Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18931 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even ifthey have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economyperspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Ourmodel is based on the fact that corrupt offcials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrativepositions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions canlead to more corruption as more voters become part of the corrupt system. Well-functioningfinancial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1293 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O17 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D73 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corruption | en |
dc.subject.keyword | financial markets | en |
dc.subject.keyword | institutions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | development | en |
dc.subject.keyword | voting | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzsektor | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | The political economy of corruption and the role of financial institutions | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 856949817 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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