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dc.contributor.authorLeininger, Wolfgangen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:42Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904-
dc.description.abstractThe implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations haverecently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves anintimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability ofstrategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest -accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show thatany evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game mustalso be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population,any number of mutants can even less do so.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1266en
dc.subject.jelC79en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleFending off one means fending off all : evolutionary stability in submodular games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn856884529en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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