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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Dalgic, Engin | en |
dc.contributor.author | Long, Ngo Van | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18886 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study the role of tax share and transparency of governance on growth and stagnation. Alocal government maximizes its private benefits using two activities. The first one consists ofproviding local public goods that help local firms to increase profits, thus enlarging taxrevenue. The second one consists of extortion. We show that there is a threshold level of localgovernment tax share, and a threshold level of transparency. Below these thresholds, theeconomy will stagnate and above them, the economy will achieve perpetual growth. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1248 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corruption | en |
dc.subject.keyword | growth | en |
dc.subject.keyword | local government | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tax share | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kommunalpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lokales öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gemeindesteuer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Regionales Wachstum | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerbelastung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Corrupt local government as resource farmers : the helping hand and the grabbing hand | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 856737674 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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